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Abstract
Previous research on targets ofprejudice attributions to discrimination
highlighted within-group differences on explicit judgments as a function of
variables such as identification and stigma-consciousness (Pinel, 1999;
Operario & Fiske, 2001). Two studies extend this research by examining
target's relatively implicit judgments ofprejudice using cognitive load and
priming methodologies. In study 1, Black participants high and low in stigma-
consciousness viewed, under load and no-load conditions, soundless video clips
of a Caucasian female ostensibly interacting with a Black female. The video
depicted the Caucasian woman acting anxiously discussing primarily anxiety-
provoking topics. Participants judged the woman's levels of anxiety and
prejudice. Judgments ofthe woman's level ofprejudice indicated a main effect
for stigma-consciousness providing preliminary evidence for chronic
differences between groups at encoding - people high in stigma-consciousness
interpreted the behavior of others in a manner that effortlessly used notions of
prejudice. In study 2, women participants high and low in stigma-consciousness
took the perspective of either a solo female among a group ofmales or an
African-American male among a group ofwhites. It was predicted that
individuals' low in stigma-consciousness could be induced to automatically
perceive gender discrimination at levels comparable to the high stigma-
consciousness group when having recently been thinking about another
Kirk Implicit Social Inferences
woman's solo status. Findings confirmed this prediction, suggesting that recent
activation of the concept "woman" may have increased perceptions of gender
discrimination as measured by trait ratings of an ambiguous male character
depicted in a separate reading task. This suggests that similar to majority
members' stereotyping processes, targets' ofprejudice may have expectancies
temporarily activated by simply priming an associated concept. In this case, the
activated expectancy associated with their group is the expectancy that one will
be treated in an unfair and biased manner. The implications ofthese results are
discussed in terms of the cognitive processes underlying inter-group processes.
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Perceptions ofPrejudice:
Implicit Social Inferences by Targets ofPrejudice
There is much empirical support for the idea that expectancies (e.g.,
Duncan, 1976; Darley & Gross, 1983) and stereotypes (e.g. Taylor & Jaggi,
1976; Devine, 1989) impact how the attitudes and actions of others are
perceived. This has typically been demonstrated by examining majority group
members' attributions towards minority group members. However, research on
the attributions of targets to the feedback they receive from majority members
suggests that they also have expectancies regarding how others interact with
them (e.g., Crocker & Major, 1989). In fact, simply knowing that stereotypes
about their group exist may lead targets ofprejudice to develop the expectancy
that others' behavior toward them is the result ofprejudiced beliefs about their
group. For example, in one study African- American participants were more
likely to discount feedback from a White evaluator when they knew that they
could be viewed through a two-way mirror compared to those who thought they
could not be viewed (Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, and Major, 1991). Other research,
suggests that there are individual differences in how much minority group
members expect to be discriminated, which may be related to how closely they
identify with their group (Operario & Fiske, 2001), or how sensitive they are to
various kinds of feedback they receive from majority groups members (pinel,
1999).
3
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In the current research, we broadly investigate the expectancies held by
targets ofprejudice regarding the motives and biases of the majority. Our
research is twofold in that we explore how targets' expectancies bias their
evaluations (e.g. at encoding, retrieval, or both processes) in order to detennine
if they are produced automatically or deliberately. Secondly, we explore how
the constructs of group identification and stigma- consciousness influence these
processes. Before reviewing evidence, let us first ask what functions such
biased judgments serve for the individual and motivate them to continue to rely
on expectancies and stereotypes.
In-Group Bias Effects
The Functions ofStereotyping and In-Group Bias
One finding that has been consistent within the literature on social
identity is that evaluations about the self are often related to ones' social
category. Moreover, this is in part due to comparisons one makes to members
of other groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Crocker et al. (1987) argued that
negative attributions toward others are often related to an individual's attempt to
defend and protect trait self-esteem from threats to self-concept. Specifically,
they examined if the in-group bias effect is the result of a need for self-
enhancement or simply in-group favoritism. They found individuals high in
self-esteem, but not those low in self-esteem, responded to threats to the self-
concept by derogating out-group members relative to in-group members.
4
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Contrary to previous research (e.g. Willis, 1981) participants' low in self-esteem
exhibited no evidence of in-group favoritism. These findings suggest that
...-,.-.. "_.
individuals high in self-esteem might maintain their positive self- concept by
engaging in self-enhancing social comparisons following a threat to the self-
concept. In a similar vein, Fein and Spencer (1997) found implicit stereotyping
to have an esteem-enhancing function. People whose self-esteem had been
threatened showed greater implicit stereotype activation.
Macrae, Milne, and Bodenhausen (1994) examined whether using
stereotypes is functional and has any efficiency benefits to social perceivers
who are under multiple processing demands. They placed participants under
cognitive load (multiple processing demands) by having them simultaneously
monitor trait information related to several targets on a computer screen while
listening to a passage on headphones related to a topic ofwhich they had little if
any exposure. For half the participants a stereotype label was provided along
with trait information. After this portion of the experiment, participants were
then given a cued recall task related to the trait information and a multiple-
choice questionnaire tapping memory for information in the passage. The
findings revealed that participants who received the labels, significantly
outperformed the other participants who viewed the trait information alone.
Based on these findings, the authors argue that stereotypes functioned as
simplifying themes in long-term memory and saved resources on one task for
5
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use by the social perceiver on the second task. While acknowledging the
negative aspects of stereotypical thinking, this work also views it as an efficient
and adaptive way of dealing with a complex social world.
A third function of stereotypes is their ability to provide plans for effective
action that can influence actual face-to-face interactions (e.g., Allport, 1954).
One side ofthis function is that one's expectancies about behavior can actually
produce the very behavior one expected. For example, Word, Zanna and
Cooper (1974) demonstrated how an individual's expectations about another
can lead them to behave in a manner that induces the other to behave in a way
that confirms the individual's original false expectation, commonly referred to
as the self-fulfilling prophecy (Merton, 1957). Specifically, they examined the
nonverbal behavior in an interracial interaction, where White participants
served as interviewers for Black and White job applicants. The findings
revealed that Black applicants received less positive non-verbal behavior than
White applicants as assessed by the distance the interviewers placed themselves
in relation to the applicants. Moreover, White interviewers spent significantly
less time with the Black applicants, and had significantly more speech errors
with Black as compared to White applicants.
In a follow- up experiment designed to confirm the effect of the self-
fulfilling prophecy, the researchers exposed White applicants to the exact same
behavior that had been exhibited by the interviewers towards Blacks in the first
6
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experiment. This was done to see ifnegative nonverbal behavior would be
reciprocated ·by applicants, and also if this would impact the applicants attitudes
toward the interviewer. In support of the self-fulfilling prophecy, the
experimenters found that applicants who were treated as the Black applicants
had been in the first experiment, performed less well, reciprocated less positive
non-verbal behavior, and found the interviewers to be less adequate than
interviewers who exhibited more positive nonverbal behaviors. These findings
suggest that in dyadic interactions one's attitudes and expectations may
influence the other person's behavior in a way that only confirms an initial false
idea.
The Influence of Stereotypes on Information Processing
Other empirical evidence has shown that expectancies in the form of
stereotypes can lead to biased social judgments. In a study by Taylor and Jaggi
(1976) participants had to imagine themselves in several behavioral scenarios in
which they had to interact with either a member of their own group or someone
from an out-group. The actions of the other individual were either socially
desirable or undesirable and the participants were provided with several
explanations for the behavior, which reflected both internal and external
attributions. It was found that participants were more likely to make internal
attributions for socially desirable behaviors, and external attributions for
undesirable behaviors, when their own group members performed them. In
7
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contrast, the opposite pattern was found when attributions were made for out-
group members on the same desirable and undesirable behaviors. In other
words, undesirable behaviors were attributed to out-group members underlying
internal characteristics, and desirable behaviors were attributed to external
causes.
In a powerful and disheartening study, Duncan (1976) examined how
negative expectancies about minority group members can influence majority
group members' perceptions of their behavior. In this study, White participants
observed one of several videos of an interaction that they were told was going
on in a nearby room between two individuals who were supposedly taking part
in a decision- makingstudy. The individuals were actually actors who were
instructed to argue, and at one point during the scenario one of the actors was
told to give the other an ambiguous shove. The independent variables were the
race ofharm-doer (White or Black) and race of the victim (White or Black)
within the scenario, the rest of the content was held constant. It was found that
the ambiguous shove was viewed as more violent when a Black as compared to
a White person perpetrated it. Moreover, external and internal casual
attributions toward the individuals also diverged along race. When the harm-
doer was Black, negative dispositional attributions were made, whereas when
they were White situational attributions were more likely.
8
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In another study, Darley and Gross (1983) suggested a two-stage
expectancy confirmation process to describe what perceivers do when they are
trying to make evaluations about a target person. Rather than viewing
expectancies as givens they suggested that perceivers are more like hypothesis-
testers, who when asked to make evaluations use their hypotheses to guide their
analysis, while also taking into consideration new behavioral information. Their
model does not necessarily preclude perceivers from making stereotypical or
biased judgments, however it does suggest that in the absence of information
perceivers may suspend their judgments. To test their model, Darley and Gross
manipulated expectancies by providing participants with information about a
target's socio-economic status, and then subsequently providing the participants
with either performance or no performance information about the same target.
Some participants watched a videotape of a child that confirmed that she came
from a low socio-economic background, for the other participants the same
child was depicted as coming from a high socio-economic background. Then
half of each of these groups was shown a videotape of the same child
participating in an oral achievement test. The remaining participants saw no
videotape. The dependent measure was how the participants rated the child on
academic ability.
Although the second videotape viewed by half the participants provided
absolutely no diagnostic information concerning the child's abilities, those who
9
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were made to believe the child came from a low-socio-economic background
rated her lower in ability. In contrast, those participants who received the
information and videotape that portrayed the child as coming from a high-
socio-economic background rated her high in ability. However, the participants
who did not watch the child's perfonnance did not significantly differ in their
ratings, suggesting that the background infonnation had not led them to draw
conclusions about the child's ability or at least these were conclusions they felt
licensed to express. This suggests that even though they may have had
hypotheses formed they were unwilling to make speculations without more
information.
The previous work highlighted that although perceivers' hypotheses tend
to be tested in a biased manner, they may not automatically make biased
judgments based on a targets social category. This demonstrates that bias does
exist, but there is some control, particularly in the absence of information.
Devine (1989) devised a series of experiments to more clearly explicate how
control and automaticity influence stereotyped judgments. In the first part of the
procedure, words were presented subliminally. For half of the participants 80%
of the words were congruent with a negative stereotype for Blacks, for the other
participants only 20% were stereotype-congruent. This was followed by an
impression formation task in which all the participants had to judge the
ambiguous behaviors of a race- unspecified target. This was done in order to
10
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detennine if the stereotype primes would lead to judgments of the target person
that were congruent with the negative stereotype (i.e. hostile). The findings
revealed that both low and high prejudice participants who received the higher
percentage of stereotype congruent primes rated the targets ambiguous behavior
as more hostile than those who received the lower percentage of stereotype-
congruent primes. These findings suggest that stereotypes can be primed
automatically regardless of one's intentions to be prejudice. According to
Devine, this should not be taken as evidence that prejudiced beliefs are
inevitable or that individuals who profess to be egalitarian are being dishonest,
but rather that the knowledge ofthe cultural stereotype is activated regardless of
one's beliefs. But despite the fact that all people have stereotypes automatically
triggered, one's use of these stereotypes can be controlled if one has the
appropriate goals in place or if situational constraint infonnation suggests that
one ought to be cautious in their judgments.
Although inhibiting the expression of activated stereotypes may indeed
be possible (e.g., Darley & Gross, 1983; Devine, 1989), Macrae, Bodenhausen,
Milne, and Jetten (1994) found that adopting the goal to actively suppress one's
use of stereotypes can also lead to rebound effects that influence perceivers
evaluations and behavior toward stereotyped individuals. In a series of
experiments, they had half of their participants actively suppress stereotypical
thoughts, and found that in subsequent essays as well as behavioral measures
11
Kirk Implicit Social Inferences
these individuals exhibited more stereotyping than those who had not been
asked to suppress stereotypical thinking. Indeed, implicit measures of
stereotype activation revealed that the stereotype was even more accessible than
if one had not tried to evade stereotypes in the first place.
The subsequent section shifts to the social judgment processes of those
individuals who are often the targets of stereotyping. What should become
evident is the fact that this literature has largely focused on explicit processes,
and unlike the literature on perceivers, not much is known about how encoding
information about a target and implicit cognitive processes during perception
may influence targets social judgments. The first few studies review what
occurs when targets receive negative or ambiguous feedback from majority
group members, followed by research on the role that expectancies play in how
targets interpret feedback, and lastly research that shows within-group
variability among minority group members in interpreting such feedback.
Target's Attributions ofPrejudice
Borrowing from a methodology used by Miller et al. (1968), Dion and
Earn (1975) were among the first researchers to empirically explore perceptions
ofprejudice from a minority member's perspective. Specifically, male
undergraduates ofJewish background were recruited and asked to perform a
ticket exchange task with three other males of Christian background. In order to
manipulate prejudice; some participants received a form where they were asked
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to provide background information that made the other players aware of their
personal background information (e.g., religious affiliation, name, languages
spoken). In a control condition, participants provided trivial background
information (e.g., year in university, hobbies).
After completing the task all the players were provided with feedback,
which indicated that they had failed severely, compared to the other players.
They then had to fill out two separate questionnaires. One was aself-
assessment scale made up of items related to stereotypic traits and self-esteem,
and the other included affect measures, manipulation checks, and ratings of the
opponents. The findings revealed that participants in the prejudice condition
attributed their failure on the task to anti-Semitism and reported feeling more
aggression, sadness, anxiety, and egoism. They also reported more stress than
participants in the no-prejudice conditions did. Moreover, participants in the
prejudice conditions rated themselves more favorably on self-esteem and the
positive dimensions of the Jewish stereotype, than did those in the no-prejudice
condition. Dion and Earn suggested that when out-group members are
threatened with prejudice this may lead to a heightened ~ense of identification
with the positive aspects of their group membership. ill a follow-up study they
also found further support for this response in female participants when they
received negative feedback from a male evaluator.
Illusory Perceptions ofNegative Feedback
13
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Kleck and Strenta (1980) explored whether persons who have a
negatively valued physical condition, for example a facial scar or epilepsy,
would attribute others' behavior in a face-to-face interaction as causally related
to their condition. This was tested in light ofprevious observations made by
several researchers who observed that physically stigmatized individuals seem
to relate the way others interact with them as being linked to their appearance
(Wright, 1960; Davis, 1961; Goffmann; 1963). It had been theorized that in this
way their stigma takes on a central role in the way these individuals perceive
their social world, in a sense, stigmatized individuals might have a heightened
expectancy to view the treatment of others as the result of their condition.
In the first experiment, participants were assigned to one of three
conditions: facial scar, epilepsy, and allergy, and were told that they would
have to later interact with another participant who was actually a confederate.
They were told that the experimenters were interested in how the other
participant's behavior would be affected by their supposed physical condition.
Two ofthe medical conditions were indicated by medical history reported on a
biographical questionnaire, the participants in the epilepsy and allergy
conditions were told to write that they had either "a mild allergy that is under
drug control" or "a mild form of epilepsy under drug control." Participants in
the facial scar condition were asked if a cosmetic facial scar could be applied to
their face and were told that as it dried it would give the appearance of a healed
14
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scar. Furthermore, the participant was given a hand mirror to watch as the scar
was placed on their face. Then, participants in all the conditions were led to a
room where they had to interact with the confederate for several minutes.
However, prior to entering the interaction the participants in the scar condition
were told that some moisturizer was going to be put on their scar to give it a
more authentic appearance when in actuality the experimenter removed the scar
completely.
The findings revealed that the scar and epilepsy participants perceived
their medical conditions as having a more negative impact on their
confederates' behavior toward them than did allergy participants. In particular,
those participants who believed they possessed a scar believed that the gaze
behavior of the confederate was focused on their scar. Similarly, those who
feigned having epilepsy believed that the confederate was more tense and
anxious in their presence. This is consistent with the notion of expectancies
offered by Kleck and Strenta and others, which suggests that individuals who
are members ofnegatively valued groups may look for behavior that confirms
their expectations.
Expectancy-Confirming Attributions to Positive and Negative Feedback
In another study, researchers examined how individuals of different levels
of attractiveness interpreted praise on a work-related task from an opposite-sex
evaluator who supposedly could either view them or not view them (Major,
15
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Carrington, & Carnevale, 1984). By exploring attributions to praise in these two
different groups, the experimenters had an opportunity to examine differences
that might exist in how both advantaged and disadvantaged group members
might interpret feedback. Just as the previous study showed how physically
devalued group members may have the expectancy that others are negatively
judging them based on their physical features, this study examined whether
attractive individuals may have the expectancy in the opposite direction. In
other words, when attractive individuals are being judged on abilities that are
independent of their appearance, they may question positive evaluations out of
concern that they may be based solely on their appearance, instead of on their
ability.
Participants were told that there was another participant seated in the
adjacent room and were led to believe that they were of the opposite sex. The
participant was then told to write a brief essay that would be persuasive enough
for the other participant to take their side on a designated issue. In one
condition, the participants were told that they were visible to the evaluator via a
one-way mirror, whereas in the other, the person was told that they were not
visible to the evaluator because this was known to influence first impressions.
After the participant completed their essay, the experimenter took their essay
for the other participant to evaluate. During this time, the participants were
given a "personal interests survey" about the evaluator, which indicated that
16
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they were currently single and looking for someone to date. This was done in
order to give the impression that the evaluator might have other reasons for
evaluating the participant's essay favorably. The experimenter then played the
evaluator's feedback via a tape-recording that was positive with respect to their
essay and always agreed with their position on the topic.
The findings revealed that when attractive students received positive
feedback from an evaluator they were more likely to discount the feedback
when the evaluator could see them versus when they were not visible. In
contrast, the unattractive students were significantly more likely to attribute
positive feedback to their performance when they had been seen than when the
evaluator had not seen them. The rationale being that these participants despite
their appearance still received positive feedback on their essay, so therefore it
must have be true.
Using a similar methodology in order to explore this issue with racial
minorities, Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, and Major (1991, Experiment 2), had
African- American students receive positive or negative feedback from a White
evaluator of the same sex who could either see them or could not see them. In
this experiment, when participants arrived they were led to believe that they
were randomly selected with a White student who was already seated in the
adjacent room for an experiment on friendship development. The participants
then filled out a self-esteem scale, which was said to be predictive of friendship
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development and a self-description form regarding several personal qualities.
Upon completion of the forms, they were told that the other participant would
have a chance to look over the information in order to determine if they thought
the two of them could become friends. Depending on the condition, the
experimenter then either told the participant that the blinds covering the one-
way mirror would be raised so that the other person could see them or left down
so that they could not see them. The participants were then left alone for several
minutes to wait for the other person's feedback.
When the experimenter returned the participant was shown either a very
favorable or a very unfavorable response from the other person (for example,
how much the other person would like to be in classes with the participant,
work with them, or become their roommate). Moreover, as the questions
became more intimate the responses either became more negative or positive.
The feedback forms, once again, also indicated the other person's sex, (which
was the same as their own), and their race (which was always White). Once the
participant read over the feedback, they then filled out another self-esteem
measure, as well as scales related to mood and feelings of inadequacy. Lastly,
they filled out a questionnaire that dealt with how various factors may have
influenced the other person's responses toward them, how much they felt as
though they had been discriminated against, and manipulation checks to ensure
that they were clear about the other person's sex and race.
18
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The findings revealed that African-American participants attributed
negative feedback more to prejudice than White participants. In addition, when
African-American participants thought that they could be seen by the other
person they believed that the unfavorable feedback had less to do with their
personality than if they could not be seen. The only condition in which the
African -American students did not attribute prejudice to their evaluator was
when positive feedback was received and the evaluator was unaware of their
race. Thus, suggesting that when they thought the other person knew their race,
even in the condition in which they received positive feedback, they were more
likely to discount the feedback. Not surprisingly, the self-esteem measures
revealed that the participants' self-esteem did not decrease in the condition in
which they could attribute feedback to prejudice. However, when the evaluator
supposedly could not see the participant and the participant received negative
feedback, their self-esteem decreased slightly.
Overall, this research suggests that members ofminority groups may be
more sensitive to both the negative and positive feedback they receive from
majority groups. Building off of this work, Major and Crocker (1993) posited
that members ofdisadvantaged groups are placed in a unique conflict when it
comes to assessing the way they are treated and judged in the social world.
They suggest that unlike members ofmore advantaged groups; the
disadvantaged are constantly faced with attributional ambiguity because they
19
Kirk Implicit Social Inferences
are unsure if the feedback they receive from advantaged group members,
regardless ofwhether it is positive or negative, reflects a bias that is the result
of their category membership, or their individual qualities or behavior.
The PersonaVGroup Discrimination Discrepancy
In contrast to the attributional ambiguity work just described, other
researchers have observed a different reaction to discrimination. It is based on a
robust finding that dates back to the work of Crosby (1982), in which survey
data revealed that women report higher group-level discrimination than
personal discrimination as a member of that group. Basically, this work
suggests that minority group members might actually minimize the prejudice
that they personally face even though they are well aware of the problem at the
societal level. This finding was later labeled the personaVgroup discrimination
discrepancy and has been replicated over the years with a number ofminority
groups (Taylor et a1., 1990; for review also see Taylor, Wright, and Porter,
1993).
According to Ruggiero and Taylor (1995) although various explanations
for the discrepancy have been offered, most notably denial, there has been no
empirical research exploring its underlying cause. Furthermore, they also
emphasize how the discrepancy contradicts the attributional ambiguity
hypothesis. In other words, if individuals minimize discrimination at the
individual level than they should be less likely to use discrimination as an
20
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explanation for the negative feedback they might receive. As a result of the lack
of empirical support and the differences in the proposed hypotheses, Ruggiero
and Taylor (1995) attempted to assess perceived discrimination using a new
empirical design. Specifically, they tried to determine under what conditions
minority group members attribute negative feedback to discrimination as
suggested by the theory of attributional ambiguity advanced by Crocker and
Major (1989), and when they are most likely to minimize discrimination as a
reason for failure as suggested by the personal/group discrimination
discrepancy hypothesis (Taylor et aI, 1993).
Using an experimental paradigm used to study the representativeness
heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973) female college students received a
failing grade on an essay graded by one of eight male evaluators whose
probability for being biased against women ranged from 0 to 100 percent.
Following the negative feedback the participants were asked to make
attributions as to what prevented them from getting better grades. The findings
revealed support for both hypotheses in that the participants minimized the
possibility that they personally had been discriminated against when the
probability for discrimination ranged between 25% and 75%. In fact, women
who were told that there was a 75% chance that the male evaluator
discriminated against women were as reluctant to blame their failure on
discrimination as the women who were told there was a 25% chance that the
21
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evaluator discriminated against women. Yet, under "high-certainty" conditions
(100%), when the potential for discrimination was relatively unambiguous
participants made personal attributions to discrimination. Therefore, targets
attributions for discrimination seem to depend on the situational ambiguity. In
other words, when the probability is relatively certain, as it quite possibly was
in the Crocker and Major studies, out-group members are likely to infer
personal discrimination. Yet, in keeping with the personal! group discrimination
discrepancy hypothesis, in those conditions where the likelihood for
discrimination is ambiguous out-group members may minimize perceptions of
prejudice.
Within-Group Variability in Targets' Perceptions
More recent work on the phenomenology ofprejudice has begun to
emphasize not only the situational differences that lead to different attributions
ofprejudice by targets, but also individual differences resulting from group
identification. For example, Operario and Fiske (2001) hypothesized that
individuals who are highly identified with their group in the sense that they
"derive personal aild emotional meaning from their social category (p. 551,
Operario & Fiske, 2001)" would be more likely to attribute prejudice in an
ambiguous interpersonal situation than group members who rate themselves
low on group identification.
22
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In order to study this, they recruited minority participants for an
experiment about "interpersonal interactions." When the participants arrived
they were met by a White experimenter, and were told that the person they
would be meeting with had already arrived and was in the adjacent room. They
were then asked to complete a questionnaire about themselves, which they were
told was also given to the other participant and was designed to help them
prepare for a ten-minute conversation they would be having with one another.
In the low ambiguity condition, the participants interacted with a White female
confederate who made it apparent through her questionnaire that she was
uncomfortable with the amount of diversity on campus. In a high ambiguity
condition, participants received a questionnaire from the same White
confederate, however for the same question regarding campus life, the item
indicated that the person was open and liked the amount ofdiversity on
campus. In both conditions, when the participant was finished reading over the
other individual's questionnaire the experimenter excused themselves and sent
in the confederate (who was blind to the condition) for the interaction. When
the confederate entered they behaved according to a script. They first
established eye contact and then looked away without greeting the participant.
The confederate then walked to the chair that was set up for the interaction and
pulled it to the other side ofthe room, sat down, and turned slightly away from
the participant. The confederate did not initiate discussion and only responded
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in one-word answers to the participants' advances to converse. After half a
minute the confederate announced that they would be right back. In the
meantime, the experimenter arrived back in the room and asked about the
confederate, waited for a couple ofminutes for them to return, and then acting
puzzled asked the participant if they would still complete the final survey
regarding the interaction that they had experienced. The survey included
questions regarding the interaction, trait ratings of the other participant, and
attributions for the other participant's behavior.
The analyses of the impression ratings revealed a significant interaction
between identification and ambiguity ofbias, indicating that high identifiers
were more sensitive to ambiguous displays ofprejudice than low identifiers.
Although the researchers predicted that high identifiers would respond equally
to both ambiguous conditions, they actually found that high identifiers
perceived the high-ambiguous condition as more indicative ofprejudice than
the low-ambiguous condition. The low identifiers had moderate, but slightly
higher ratings for prejudice in the low ambiguous condition, and very low
attributions for prejudice in the highly ambiguous condition. These results
reveal a differential effect for the two groups. It seems as though high
identifiers perceived the highly ambiguous condition as slightly more indicative
ofprejudice than the low ambiguous condition, but the low identifiers
perceived the blatant (low ambiguous condition) as more indicative of
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prejudice. Operario and Fiske suggest that the high identifiers possibly saw the
conflicting behavior of the confederate in the highly ambiguous situation as
more troubling because it suggested a more subtle form of discrimination.
Building off of the idea that stereotypes function as expectancies, Pinel
(1999) designed a specific measure that taps individual differences in
expectations for being stereotyped based on group membership. Pinel termed
this construct stigma-consciousness and validated it on a number of different
target groups, for example Blacks, Asians, Women, Hispanics, gay men and
lesbians. In comparing ethnic identification with stigma-consciousness with
respect to expectations of discrimination, Operario & Fiske (2001) argue that
while ethnic identity seems to moderate expectancies for discrimination it may
have the added effect of enhancing psychological well-being, after all as noted
previously if one can attribute discrimination to ethnic affiliation then one's
own behavior need not be further examined. Stigma-consciousness, on the other
hand, they argue may only serve to enhance perceptions ofprejudice or as Pinel
(1999) has suggested may actually lead out-group members to avoid
opportunities that will disconfirm stereotypes about their group. Yet, because
this measure is relatively new few empirical studies have used it as a means to
understanding target's expectancies, so further research is necessary to fully
understand how this individual difference variable influences their social
inference processes.
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Cognitive Processes Mediating Attributions to Discrimination
Over the last few decades there has been an abundance of research on how
stereotypes function as expectancies that bias the encoding and retrieval of
social information and thus lead to biased attributions on the part ofmajority
group members. When tracing the development of this literature it is obvious
that there is a definite progression from first looking at how stereotypes
influence the types of attributions that are made toward out-group members to
understanding the cognitive processes that give rise to stereotypical kinds of
attributions. Clearly, when we compare the literature on the stereotypes made
by in-group members with the work that has been done with respect to the same
kinds ofprocesses in out-group members we find a discrepancy in the amount
that is known. For example, although the research reviewed emphasized
different aspects to the phenomenology ofprejudice there are some definite
similarities in the methodological and theoretical orientations. First, in all the
empirical work reviewed the participants either performed some kind of explicit
task or were asked to imagine a scenario in which they received negative
performance feedback from evaluators who ranged in terms ofhow likely they
were to be prejudiced toward the participant. In addition, all participants were
explicitly asked to draw inferences on the likelihood that they were being
discriminated against, and in this way played a rather passive role in the tasks
they were given.
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What remain unknown are the mechanisms through which attributions of
prejudice are produced. There are distinct possibilities, which are not mutually
exclusive. First, participants may be exhibiting a biased retrieval of
information. When asked why one has received negative feedback one may at
that point deliberate and reflect on the prior interaction, and through such
processes yield a judgment that suggests one was the target ofbias. Second,
participants might be forming such impressions ofbias on-line, as the
interaction unfolds or as feedback is received. Third, even if impressions ofbias
are formed on-line, are these produced through spontaneous and implicit
processes that determine how feedback is interpreted, or are these impressions
formed through effortful analysis ofthe incoming feedback. Finally, if low and
high identifiers, or for that matter low and high stigma-consciousness
individuals, differ in their attributions to prejudice, is this difference due to
implicit inferences made at encoding that differ between groups or due to a
more consciously motivated attempt to use effortful cognition to protect self-
esteem.
Research on social inference processes has highlighted how such
questions regarding the automatic versus controlled nature of information
processing can be explored by examining how cognitive load can impact the
kinds of inferences individuals are likely to make (e.g. Brewer, 1988; Gilbert et
aI, 1988). By adopting methodologies that explore how cognitive load can
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influence minority group members attributions to prejudice we might be able to
tease apart whether these difference occur at encoding or retrieval and whether
they are the result of automatic or more deliberate processes. The evolution in
attribution research is obvious when one turns to examine early models of
attribution. These models largely focused on describing the deliberate, rational
processes that the average perceiver engages in when drawing causal inferences
about the behavior of others (Heider, 1944; Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley,
1971). It was assumed that perceivers were motivated toward accuracy in their
judgments and had ample cognitive resources available when drawing causal
inferences about others. Kelley (1971) further outlined two principle heuristics
that perceivers use to guide their causal attributions about a target's behavior.
He suggested that when there is more than one potential cause for a behavior,
perceivers are less likely to make an internal attribution. He referred to this as
discounting because the behavior is viewed as uninformative of the target's true
disposition, thus discounting the target's disposition as a potential cause for
behavior. For example, applying this rule a perceiver would be less likely to
attribute friendly feedback from a target to their underlying disposition ifit was
clear that some ulterior motive existed that could explain why the target was
behaving friendly, like needing votes to get elected to an office. In contrast,
Kelley suggested that ifperceivers are aware that there are situational
constraints preventing a target from behaving in a particular manner, but
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nonetheless the target performs the behavior in spite of the constraints, then the
behavior is inferred to be diagnostic of their true disposition. Kelley referred to
this phenomenon as augmenting. An example of augmenting, using a similar
kind of example as before, would be attributing genuineness to a politician who
supports a viewpoint that deviates from popular opinion.
Although Kelley's principles seem intuitively correct and there are times
when both dispositional and situational information is considered by perceivers,
theoretical and empirical work suggests that dispositions and situations are not
treated equally by perceivers, in fact more often than not there is a tendency for
perceivers to see behavior as diagnostic of a targets true disposition. The idea
that perceivers may over-attribute behavior to a targets underlying disposition
was described by a number of theorists (e.g., Heider, 1944), but it became more
readily known when it was termed correspondent inference (Jones, 1979) or the
fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977). Empirical support for the
phenomenon was first provided in a study by Jones and Harris (1967) where
participants were asked to read a political speech and determine the author's
true attitude toward the issue. Some of the participants were told that the author
had complete choice to write what they wanted; whereas others were told that
the author had no choice in what they could write. The results indicated that
participants in both conditions drew similar conclusions about the authors, that
is, even when participants were aware that the author was constrained to write a
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speech that was incongruent with their actual attitude, they nonetheless rated it
as indicative of the author's true political attitude. In other words, rather than
discounting the political attitude because it was situationally induced, the
participants instead ignored the situational constraint infonnation and drew a
dispositional inference.
Empirical support for the correspondence bias was important because it
questioned the way in which perceivers make inferences, rather than seeing
perceivers as making objective, controlled judgments, it instead gave credibility
to the idea that there may be a perceptual, automatic nature to the way in which
inferences about others are made and that this may lead to biased judgments
(Heider, 1944). This coupled with the cognitive revolution set the stage for a
line of reasoning about social inference processes that focused less on explicit
nonnative processes and more on the biases that guide perceivers' judgments.
Moreover, at the same time research on categorization made it apparent that
perceivers do not come to situations with a mentally clean state, but instead
have expectancies in the fonn of accessible concepts (such as stereotypes) that
constrain the judgments they fonn about others (e.g., Bruner, 1957). As a result
of this kind of thinking, new models ofperson perception evolved, which
highlighted the processing stages involved in attributional inference, and how
they differed in tenns of attentional resources (Quattrone, 1982; Trope, 1986;
Gilbert, 1988). Included within all of these models was the notion that
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inferences initially involve an automatic categorization about the actions of the
target that is done without conscious intent, followed by a dispositional
characterization about the target, and finally a more deliberate process of
correction that adjusts inferences based on situational information. The
empirical support that came along with these models provided further evidence
for the processes that lead to the correspondence bias, in that it was found that
when perceiver's were unable to correct their initial judgments because of
limited cognitive resources they were more likely to make dispositional
inferences (e.g., Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988).
The current research borrows from the paradigmatic shift in attribution
theory; only it applies it to perceivers who may be faced with specific
attributional challenges as a result ofbelonging to a group who has a history of
being discriminated against. As illustrated from the work on targeted groups,
instead of simply making an attribution based on dispositional and situational
information, these groups may also have another potential choice in their
attributional analyses. Specifically, they may have to make a determination as
to whether the cause of someone's behavior toward them is the result of
prejudice. Prior research has mirrored early attributional research by focusing
on explicit attributions that simply reveal what people do when faced with
negative feedback from majority group members rather than addressing how
and why these attributions are produced. We hope to explicate at what stage
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inferences to discrimination might be occurring in order to explain the within-
group differences that have been found in explicit judgment ratings.
STUDY 1: THE EFFECTS OF COGNTIVE LOAD ON ATTRIBUTIONS TO
PREJUDICE
Overview
Study 1 represents a first attempt at investigating the mechanisms that give
rise to attributions ofprejudice by targets ofprejudice. We believe that previous
differences in attributions ofprejudice found on explicit tasks as a function of
individual differences, such as identification and stigma-consciousness level,
will be better understood by manipulations that influence cognitive processing
such as cognitive load.
The three- stage model of attribution offered by Gilbert (1988) has
suggested that cognitively busy perceivers, particularly those under heavy
cognitive demands, are unable to alter the inferences they have initially made at
encoding. Thus, ifpeople initially infer traits about people, and subsequently
alter those inferences to adjust them for situational influences, then this latter
adjustment would be wiped out when under cognitive load. Additionally, if the
initial inference survives unchanged, it suggests these inferences are fairly
implicit and free from capacity constraints. This is precisely what Gilbert et al.
(1988) found. Perceivers watched a videotape ofa woman engaged in a
conversation with a stranger, her non-verbal behavior in the tape indicated that
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she was anxious, however some of the participants were told that she was
discussing mundane topics whereas others were told that she was discussing
anxiety- provoking topics. Moreover, some ofthe participants were told to
memorize the topics listed at the bottom of the screen in sequential order (load
condition), whereas others simply had to watch the tape (no load condition).
The results revealed that participants who were in the no load condition were
able to make use of the situational constraint information and thus attributed her
anxiety to the topics being discussed. In contrast, the participants in the load
conditions inferred that she was dispositionally anxious suggesting that they
were not only unable to use the situational information, but were still able to
make inferences about her disposition. These findings suggest that information
is initially formed in terms of dispositions in a quite effortless manner and when
perceivers are prevented from further processing they are unable to use
situational information to "correct" for their initial, automatic characterization.
By using the same methodology we hope to tease apart if the individual
differences that have been observed in high and low identifiers attributions (and
high and low in stigma-consciousness) to prejudice at the explicit level are the
same or different at initial stages ofprocessing. In other words, by using a
cognitive load manipulation we will have a relatively pure measure of
participants' initial, automatic dispositional judgments. If these are the same as
participants' explicit judgments then we can infer that the differences found at
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the explicit level are due to chronic automatic differences in out-group
members' expectancies to see prejudice. If their inferences reveal a different
pattern under load then we will have to explore what is motivating the
differences between these relatively implicit and explicit judgments. So, ifwe
replicate the typical effect found on explicit measures, that high identifiers and
high stigma-consciousness out-group members infer more prejudice than those
who rate low on these two dimensions, however, then find that they do not
make this inference under cognitive load, for example, instead see less
prejudice, then it might indicate that highs' deliberate judgments are the result
of some motivation to infer prejudice. This of course might also be the case for
lows, as well, so it is also plausible that lows' initial, automatic judgments
might be high in prejudice, but through motivated reasoning they dampen this
inference which leads to later judgments that reflect a lower rating ofprejudice.
In sum, we suspect that there are many plausible patterns, which might
be observed in our data in terms of anxiety and prejudice ratings. Our main
interest is in participants' prejudice ratings. We believe that the data may reflect
that (1) those low and high in identification/and stigma-consciousness have
developed different automatic strategies such that they differ at the level of
encoding and this carries through to their explicit judgments, (2) that both low
and high identifiers/ stigma-consciousness individuals make an inference to
prejudice initially, however, low identifiers and low stigma-consciousness
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individuals less motivated to infer prejudice, will be more likely to engage in
"effortful correction" processes that allow for the initial impression of others as
having stereotyped the target to be adjusted, and (3) that low and high
identifiers and stigma-consciousness make no inferences to prejudice initially,
however high identifiers/ stigma-consciousness individuals are motivated to
infer prejudice, and through deliberate and effortful processing such bias is
ultimately perceived either at encoding, or at retrieval through a biased recall of
the information that had been (what Chaiken, Liberman, &Eagly, 1989, called
biased systematic processing).
In terms of anxiousness ratings we do not expect a clear dissociation as
was found in the original Gilbert et al. (1988) study because participants will
not be making a determination of simply dispositional or situational
anxiousness, but instead one of anxiousness and prejudice. It is quite possible
that participants will view the target as anxious because she is prejudice.
Therefore, although we suspect that attributions to prejudice will likely differ as
a function of the individual difference variables and possibly load it is less
apparent how participants in the different conditions will rate the target in terms
of the anxiousness measures. However, ifwe do find that there are main effects
for load such that participants under cognitive load rate the target as more
anxious than those not under load then it will lend support to the notion that the
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load manipulation did in fact disable correction processes, and that the initial
judgments reflect more automatic processing.
Method
PARTICIPANTS
Participants were 52 Black undergraduate students (24 male, and 28
female) from Lehigh University contacted by email to participate in an hour-
long study on interracial friendship formation. Students received credit for
participating as part of a requirement of their introductory psychology course,
or received $10.00 for volunteering to participate in the study. None ofthe
participants were aware of the fact that only Black students were recruited for
the study until they were debriefed after the experiment was completed.
MATERIALS
Participants watched 20- second clips of a digitized video with no audio of
a White female target presented via a Dell Dimension 8200 with a Pentium 4
processor and 256 MB RAM attached to a 17 inch Dell E770 Color Display
Monitor. The images were embedded within a pre-timed PowerPoint
presentation. Participants then filled out measures tapping their perceptions of
the targets prejudice and anxiety, recall of the topics that were presented along
with the video clips, the Crocker and Luhtanen Race -Specific measure of
ethnic identity (1992), and the Stigma-Consciousness Scale (SCQ) (pinel,
1999).
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When participants arrived the experimenter gave them a brief oral
introduction about the purpose of the experiment. The participants were then
escorted to a room equipped with a video monitor where they remained for the
duration of the experiment.
The written instructions delivered via the computer explained that
participants were to watch several short clips from a videotape of a getting-
acquainted conversation, where college students in the videotape discussed a
variety of topics as a means to understanding interracial friendship formation in
students. Participants were told that the two female students on the videotape,
one White and one African American, had never met and had been asked to
discuss the topics for about 5 minutes each. The participants were also told that
they would only watch a brief clip from each of the topic segments
(approximately 20 sec.). The instructions also explained that during the getting-
acquainted discussion the camera had been positioned behind one of the
interactants and therefore only one student (always the African -American
interactant) would never be visible on the tape. Lastly, they were told that in
order to protect the privacy of the students they would be watching the
videotape without any sound. However, the topics of discussion would appear
at the bottom of the video screen in subtitles. In all of the conditions, the
participants viewed subtitles of topics in which the majority ofthe topics (5 out
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of 7) indicated the target was discussing anxiety-inducing topics (e.g. sexual
fantasies, embarrassing moments, public humiliation) the remaining two topics
were simply favorite hobbies and ideal vacations (see Table 1). In each of the
anxiety-inducing topic clips the target appeared anxious and uncomfortable, as
most people would when talking to a complete stranger about personal topics,
in the remaining 2 clips she appeared relaxed, which would suggest to a viewer
who had the available cognitive resources to ponder the topics that the target
was only uncomfortable when the topics were of a highly personal nature.
Half the participants were randomly assigned to either the load or no-
load conditions. In the no-load condition participants were told that after the
videotape was over they would be asked to answer some questions about the
target's personality. The participants in the load condition were told that in
addition to answering some questions about the target's personality, they would
also be asked to recall each of the discussion topics in the correct order in
which they were shown. These participants were told that this was so we could
compare their memory of the topics with the actual interactants memories for
the same topics. As in the study by Gilbert et al. (1988), we thought this would
provide adequate limitations on the participant's cognitive capacity in that the
participants would be busy rehearsing the topics. Moreover, it also ensured that
the load was not simply misdirecting participants' attention in such a way that
they were unable to notice or identify the situational constraints, but instead
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would show an inability to use the information because oflack of cognitive
resources. Participants also received written instructions presented via the
PowerPoint presentation prior to the video clips being shown. After the
participants watched the video clips, they filled out measures regarding the
target's likelihood for prejudice, the target's trait anxiety, predictions ofher
future anxiety in several hypothetically embarrassing situations, recall of the
topics discussed, and then finally the identification and stigma-consciousness
questionnaires. Lastly, the participants were debriefed about the purposes of the
study.
DEPENDENT MEASURES
Perceivedprejudice. This measure required the participants to rate the target's
likelihood for prejudice on the following items: (a) is probably biased (not
biased) against people from minority groups (b) is comfortable (uncomfortable)
with people not like her, (c) treats all different kinds ofpeople with respect (no
respect) (d) is prejudiced. The scale ranged from 1=strongly disagree to
7=strongly agree.
Perceived trait anxiety. This measure required that the participants rate the
target's dispositional anxiety on the following items: (a) is probably
comfortable (uncomfortable) in social situations, (b) is a calm (nervous) sort of
person, and (c) is generally relaxed (anxious) with people. The range of choices
were 1= strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree.
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Predicted anxiety. Participants were asked to predict the target's state anxiety in
each ofthree hypothetical situations taken directly from Gilbert et al. (1988):
(a) when being asked to give an impromptu presentation at a seminar, (b) when
noticing that a male acquaintance had seen her lose her bikini at a local pool,
and (c) when noticing a run in her stocking during a corporate interview.
Participants predicted the target's state anxiety in each ofthese situations on a
7-point bipolar scale anchored with the phrases extremely anxious and not at all
anxious.
Recall ofdiscussion topics. In addition, after the participants filled out the other
measures they were asked to recall the discussion topics in the proper order.
Collective Self-Esteem Scale (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). Participants filled
out this 16- item measure that taps ethnic identification.
Stigma-Consciousness questionnaire (SCQ) (Pinel, 1999). Participants filled
out this 10-item measure designed to measure expectancies to be
discriminateagainst by others based one's group membership.
Results
Load manipulation.
After watching the video and rating the participant on the anxiousness
and prejudice items, participants were asked to recall the discussion topics they
saw in the video. Participants' recall attempts were coded as follows: no points
if the participant failed to recall the topic, 1 point if the participant recalled the
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topics meaning, but not its actual wording (e.g.failure as opposed to personal
failures), and 2 points if the participant recalled the complete topic. Participants
could therefore receive from 0 to 14 points on the recall index.
After scoring the protocols for the number of topics recalled, there were
two missing data points due to experimenter error, and one due to a participant
who reported accidentally skipping the recall page. Therefore, there were a total
of24 instead of27 participants included in the no-load condition for the
analysis. However, the highly significant difference between the two conditions
suggests that had there been no missing data there would have still been a
difference in the number of topics recalled,! (47) =2.99 p, <.004. The
participants in the load condition recalled more topics (M=9.88) than did the
no-load participants (M=7.50). This suggests that the participants in the load
condition devoted more cognitive resources to the rehearsal of the discussion
topics.
Behavioral Manipulation.
Two aspects ofour study that differ from the Gilbert et al. (1988)
anxious woman study are important to mention before reviewing our findings.
First, in Gilbert et al. (1988), the participants had to make a determination along
only one trait dimension, the targets behavior was either anxious or not, in the
latter case the situation was the alternative cause for her anxiousness. This was
because part ofthe intent of that study was to show that load eliminates
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people's ability to correct for the situation (augment or discount) and what is
left is a dispositional inference. In our study, the participants had to rate the
target along two dispositional dimensions, anxiousness or prejudice. So, in our
study the possible causal inferences that could be made about the target's
behavior could include: dispositional anxiousness, prejudiced attitudes towards
members of other groups, some combination ofthese two options, or
anxiousness due to the situation. This was done in order to create some
ambiguity as to the cause ofthe targets behavior-we did not want the behavior
to look so strong or obvious that anyone viewing the target would make the
inference ofprejudice. This would not have been a good analog for the
attributional ambiguity that target's ofprejudice supposedly face and would
have simply given us results that reflect what occurs when out-group members
are faced with more certain conditions ofprejudice. In addition, in the Gilbert et
al. study load was crossed with discussion topics, such that some participants
saw the same behavioral information, but with either mostly relaxing or mostly
anxious topics. A key point that they made was that despite rehearsing the
topics and recalling more of them, which would have provided ample
explanation for the target's anxiousness, cognitively busy perceivers were
unable to use this information and thus rated the target as dispositionally
anxious. In our study, all participants saw the same behavioral information
with mostly anxious topics, so they all could have assumed that her anxiousness
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was due to the anxiety-provoking topics (the situation), particularly if they have
the cognitive resources to correct away from a dispositionally-related cause
(prejudice or anxiousness). Less clear, in our study, is how anxiousness and
prejudice would be partitioned among targets because one potential aspect of
prejudice is being uncomfortable around members of another group, so
prejudice and anxiousness could look the same to a perceiver. Nonetheless, we
were interested to see what would happen when members of the same group,
who differ in their expectancies for prejudice and their group affiliation, saw
the exact same information. As an alternative to prejudice, anxiousness was
plausible as an explanation, and the stimuli had already been used successfully
by others. Therefore, it made sense to include it, but we had no clear predictions
as to how the participants would rate the target on the anxiety measure.
Individual Difference Scores.
The scores on both the Identification Scale (Crocker and Luhtanen,
1992) and the SCQ were tabulated by reverse coding the appropriate items and
then computing participants score on each measure. Descriptive statistics of this
data revealed an insufficient range of scores on the Identification Scale
(range=2.25), such that the majority ofthe sample rated themselves as high in
this dimension (min =4.50 and max=6.75, M=5.48). It is difficult to speculate
why this occurred, but one explanation might be the fact that Black students
make up a relatively small portion of the campus population, this combined
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with recent diversity initiatives on campus may leave these student with an
even greater sense of affiliation with their group and its relative importance in
their overall identity. Because there was an insufficient range of identity scores
for our purposes, the results herein deal only with stigma-consciousness, for
which there was a sufficient range of scores (range=47, min.= 13 and max.=60,
mean=39).
Perceived Prejudice ofTarget.
A regression analyses was performed to determine ifparticipants SC
scores were predictive of their prejudiced ratings of the target. In order to do
this, the 4 items tapping perceived prejudice of the target (1=low prejudice and
7=high prejudice) were averaged to create a perceived prejudice index (a= .71).
This index was then entered into a regression analysis with SC scores as the
predictor. The results, as anticipated suggest a relationship between
participants' expectancies for prejudice and their attributions of the target's
prejudice, r =.33, p <.05.
In order to more closely examine the relationship between SC scores
and attributions ofprejudice a median split was performed on the stigma-
consciousness scores, dividing the sample into a low and a high group. A 2 X 2
between subjects ANOVA with load and stigma-consciousness performed on
the prejudice index revealed a significant main effect for stigma-consciousness,
E(l, 48) = 8.8612<.005. There was no significant main effect for load or a
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significant load by stigma-consciousness interaction, Fs< 1. These results fit
closely with our first prediction that low stigma-consciousness individuals'
prejudiced ratings would be lower than high stigma-consciousness individuals
(see Table 2). Therefore, individuals low in stigma consciousness attributed the
target's ambiguous behavior significantly less to prejudice than high stigma
consciousness individuals, in fact the cell means were below the midpoint of
the scale suggesting they slightly disagreed with an attribution ofprejudice.
These results support the hypothesis that low and high stigma-consciousness
individuals have different automatic strategies providing preliminary evidence
for the notion that they differ in terms ofhow they encode the ambiguous
behavior ofmajority members and this may then carry though to their more
controlled judgments. Since the load should have disabled explicit processing,
and the difference found between the recall ofdiscussion topics in the load and
no load conditions provides indirect evidence of this, we believe that the
judgments ofprejudice were made relatively automatically and effortlessly.
Trait Anxiousness Ratings ofthe Target.
The three measures ofperceived trait anxiety (comfortable-
uncomfortable, calm-nervous, and relaxed-anxious) were averaged to create a
perceived trait anxiety index (a= .59). A 2 X 2 ANDVA performed on this
index revealed no significant effects, Es <1 (See Table 3). This tells us that
irrespective of load, both groups saw a sufficient amount of anxiety, which
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confirmed that our target's behavior was in fact ambiguous enough to warrant
at least two plausible explanations for the anxiousness she exhibited as she was
discussing the anxiety provoking topics, in addition to the alternative which
would be that she was behaving in this manner due to the situation only
(discussing anxiety-provoking topics). That is, her behavior could be construed
as either due to pure dispositional anxiousness or anxiousness due to prejudice,
or some combination of these two qualities. So, if the participants had
perceived her as not anxious at all, but as prejudice only, than we might have
had to have questioned whether our target's anxious behavior was too strong as
to lead to only one conclusion. However, we did not want that, instead we
wanted to create just enough ambiguity so as to see how participants'
expectancies might influence their perceptions of the target.
Behavior Predictions ofthe Target.
Included in the ratings were three items that were used in the original
Gilbert et a1., (1988) study tapping participants' predictions of the target's
anxiety in three hypothetical situations. After reverse coding, these were
averaged in order to get a mean state anxiety index ((1,,=. 69). This index was
then entered into a 2 X 2 ANOVA with stigma-consciousness and load. The
analysis revealed only a significant main effect for load, E(1, 48) = 4.23, g<
.05. The ratings ofpredicted anxiety were lower for the no load condition (see
Table 4). These findings make sense in light ofmost models ofperson
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perception, which suggest that people generally make an initial dispositional
inference and later correct for situational information. They also lend support to
the notion that the load manipulation did in fact work.
Discussion
In the first study, the relatively implicit processes ofhigh and low stigma-
consciousness individuals revealed that the lows inferred less prejudice than the
highs across the load conditions. This occurred despite the fact that both groups
did in fact perceive quite a bit of anxiousness on the part of the target, and the
participants in the load condition remembered significantly more topics, thus
indicating that they were in fact more cognitively busy than the no-load
participants. With respect to the trait anxiousness ratings of the target we had
originally been unsure as to what to predict due to the fact that the appearance
ofbeing anxiousness could be inferred as being the result ofprejudice. What
we found was that there were only slight differences in the trait anxiety ratings
for the two groups, which confirmed our earlier suspicions that prejudice can be
manifested as anxiousness. For the behavioral prediction anxiety measure our
findings were in line with Gilbert et aI's. findings, such that participants were
able to correct and use situational constraint information when more cognitive
resources were available.
We believe the combined effects found on the prejudice ratings and future
behavior ratings, is enough to suggest that the individual differences
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traditionally found on explicit measures that tap attributions to prejudice may
be the result of chronic automatic differences between members of out-groups.
The fact that there was more of change across the load conditions on both the
prejudice and predicted anxiety measures for the low SC group compared to the
high SC group may be due to a possible trade-off that was occurring for this
group. Specifically, when the low SC group was under load their mean
prejudice rating was low, whereas their mean predicted behavioral anxiety
rating was high. Under no load, free from capacity constraints, they then
perceived more prejudice and predicted less behavioral anxiety. For the high
SC group, the inability to adjust from an initial inference may be due to a
hyper-accessibility of the expectancy that is difficult to correct once it is
activated. Future investigations should continue to explore these possibilities.
In the next study we tum to examine whether activating group
membership with out participants awareness, through the use of a perspective-
taking manipulation, can alter the pattern found in the first study. We predict
that individuals low in stigma-consciousness, after being primed with the
concept of "woman" will be significantly more likely to infer gender-bias on
the part of an ambiguous target as compared to when they simply are asked to
take another out-group members perspective. The logic of the next study is that
if the pattern found in the first study is due to chronic differences between lows
and highs, then making the concept used by the highs one that is more
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accessible for the lows might lead to similar inferences in the two groups. This
will help illustrate that implicit differences in construal and inference were what
drove the effect in the first place by making the group who typically does not
perform the implicit inference more likely to do so via an implicit prime that
makes these concepts as accessible as they are assumed to be in the highs.
In this next study we chose women as our out-group due to the limited number
ofBlack participants from which we could draw our sample. Nonetheless, our
pattern of findings should be relatively comparable across out-groups, as the
expectancy processes we are discussing are not unlike other basic
categorization processes that have been discussed in the social psychology
literature.
STUDY 2: CAN EXPECTANCIES FOR DISCRIMINATION BE
SITUATIGNALLY INDUCED?
In this study we used a perspective taking manipulation, where female
participants were asked to write a narrative about the day in the life of either a
solo Black male amongstCaucasians or a solo woman amongst males. This
assignment was the first in a packet of other materials ofwhat was ostensibly a
number of studies being run by different experimenters in the psychology
department. This was designed to eliminate the connection between the
perspective-taking manipulation intended to prime the concept of female group
membership and a subsequent task in which the same participants were asked to
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rate the behavior of an ambiguously gender biased male named Donald
depicted in a short paragraph (see Appendix A). In between these tasks
participants performed a filler task.
It was hypothesized that taking the perspective of the solo female would
activate concepts related to being a woman thus making them temporarily
accessible for use when rating the ambiguous behavior ofDonald in the
subsequent task. As a result, we expected that ratings ofDonald on traits related
to gender-bias would be elevated for the highs regardless of the perspective-
taking manipulation, but for the low stigma-consciousness group we anticipated
higher ratings of gender bias only for those who had taken the female
perspective. We used the African- American solo among Whites as our control
perspective taking condition because it is well known that both African
Americans and women have faced prejudice in situations where they have solo
status. In this way, the African American male among a group ofwhites
represented a closely matched control condition, and taking this perspective
should not activate concepts related to gender-bias, so we would not expect it to
influence the low stigma-consciousness groups' later judgments on the
subsequent task.
Method
PARTICIPANTS
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Participants were 68 undergraduate female students from Lehigh
University contacted by email to participate in an hour- long study on
impression fonnation. Students received credit for participating as part of a
requirement of their introductory psychology course.
MATERIALS
Participants received a packet ofmaterials with a cover sheet indicated
that they would be completing several short unrelated tasks by different
experimenters in the psychology department. The first page, in a font different
from the other tasks, described a narrative essay- writing task in which the
participants were told they were to adopt the perspective ofthe individual in a
photograph and imagine a day in his or her life. The following page included
the photocopy of a photograph with space to write the narrative. Half the
participants received a photograph depicting a solo woman among many males,
and the other half received a photograph of a Black male among a group of
white individuals. The next page was a filler task that involved counting
backwards from 7 and circling numbers evenly divisible by seven. This was
followed by a reading comprehension/impression fonnation task in which
participants read a modified version of the ambiguous Donald story (see
Appendix A) in which the male in the story is depicted as ambiguously gender-
biased. This was taken from Srull & Wyer (1979), we made subtle changes to
the text such that all ofDonald's ambiguous behaviors were in his interactions
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with women such that landlord was changed to land lady and store clerk was
changed to sales woman. They also filled out trait ratings ofDonald based on a
7- point scale ranging from 1=not at all to 7=extremely. Neutral traits included
traits that could be seen as either positive or negative, such as: careful,
superstitious, and curious. The gender- biased traits included terms such as
chauvinistic, discriminatory, biased, condescending, and dominating. The
gender-biased traits were the top responses pulled from a small pilot survey,
which asked undergraduate women to list behaviors that were indicative of
gender bias.
PROCEDURE
Upon consent, participants were given the packet ofmaterials and told to
complete it without skipping pages. The first few pages included the
instructions and forms to complete the narrative-writing task. This task served"
as the perspective- taking manipulation, which was designed to prime the
concept ofbeing female for only those participants who were asked to write
about the day in the life of the solo female depicted in the photograph, not those
who were instructed to write about the solo Black male's perspective. After
completing this task, participants had to count backwards by seven from 368
and write their answers until they had completed several rows. This was
followed by a task that involved circling numbers divisible by seven. The next
page involved reading the ambiguous Donald passage followed by another page
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with the trait ratings. Lastly, participants were asked if they would not mind
completing another quick scale that was part of another study, which was the
stigma-consciousness questionnaire.
Results
Coding ofNarratives
Before running analyses on the data, the narratives were first coded to
determine ifparticipants did the task correctly. Ratings of 0 to 4 were given
depending on the extent to which participants took the perspective of the person
they were supposed to write about. A score of 0 indicated that the task was not
completed in a manner sufficient to assume that the participant had noticed the
targets solo status, or provided sufficient narrative to suggest that they took the
task seriously. A score of 1 or 2 signified that they wrote quite a bit ofmaterial,
but the degree to which the solo status of the person depicted was noticed was
unclear. A 3 or 4 was given if the participant noticed the target's solo status and
wrote about it in some detail, which suggested that they did in fact take the
target's perspective. Once the coding was completed and checked for reliability
(r (68) =.83), ten participants who received a 0 were dropped from the sample
as their protocols were an indication that they did not attend to the narrative
task. This left us with 58 participants for the final analyses.
Results
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The trait adjectives we used were ones that piloted undergraduate women
associated with gender-bias. This included the following traits: chauvinistic,
discriminatory, biased, condescending, and dominating. The mean of these five
trait items was computed and used as the dependent measure (a= .59). Entering
this into a 2 X 2 ANOVA with stigma-consciousness (high and low) and
perspective (solo female and solo black male) revealed the predicted
interaction, E(1,54) = 3.86, g < .05. As predicted, the difference between high
(M=5.06) and low (M=4,32) SC individuals was significant in the Black male
perspective taking condition,! (54) =2.11, g<.05. Ratings were marginally
higher for those low in stigma-consciousness who had taken the perspective of
the solo female (M= 4.86), but not for those lows in the solo Black male
perspective taking condition (M= 4,32),! (54) =1. 66, g=.10. These results
suggests that individuals with a low expectancy only saw Donald as gender-
biased after they have been thinking about a woman's solo status, but not when
they were thinking about the solo status of another minority group member. In
addition, there was no difference in the gender-biased ratings ofDonald for the
high stigma-consciousness group regardless ofthe perspective they took
(M=4.65 and M=5.05), t(54) = 1.05, p. 05, nor was there a significant
difference between the lows and high SCs who had taken the female
perspective (M=4.86, and M=4.65, respectively), ! (54) =.64, g>.05.
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In order to rule out that the interaction effect was not due to a more
general negative reaction to the target, but in fact a response to the category-
congruent traits, the other conceivably negative traits that were part of the trait
measure were averaged (e.g., absent-minded, impractical, and unhealthy) and
this score was entered into a 2 X 2 ANOVA with the independent variables.
The results indicated that the there were no significant differences among the
groups, but more importantly all the means were below the midpoint of the
scale (below 4.00), suggesting that participants were not simply having a
negative reaction to the target.
Discussion
These findings suggest that by temporarily activating the concept of
one's group, in this case, women, those members who we believe typically do
not perceive ambiguous behavior as gender- biased actually do. This is not
surprising if we consider previous work by Devine (1989, Study 2), which
indicated that when low prejudiced participants' ability to consciously monitor
stereotype activation was precluded their ratings of an ambiguous target on
stereotype congruent evaluations were similar to high prejudiced participants.
What we are suggesting here is not very different. That is, the underlying
categories of groups are the same regardless ofwhether one is a member of
majority group that holds expectancies regarding those in the minority, or one is
a member of a minority group who holds expectancies regarding majority
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members. Where people differ is in the relative accessibility ofthose categories
at encoding. Priming the expectancy can therefore increase the accessibility for
people who typically have the knowledge available, but not accessible. Another
alternative explanation for the finding that the low SC group who had been
exposed to the Black male perspective had significantly lower ratings of
gender-bias ofDonald could be that this triggered concepts related to race bias,
then using this as a standard of comparison reduced the relative importance of
gender-bias for low SC individuals. It would have been helpful to have had a
control group that did not receive the perspective taking task to rule out this
possible explanation.
General Discussion
Previous work has shown that stereotypes are expectancies that bias
encoding and retrieval, typically at the preconscious level, without perceivers'
necessarily conscious intention to do so. Our experiments suggest that these
principles not only apply to expectancies for interpreting the behavior of
stigmatized groups by the majority, as in the case of stereotyping, but also
stigmatized individuals' interpretations ofwhether the majority group is
prejudiced toward them. In other words, those who are typically the targets of
societal prejudice have expectancies regarding those who are the perpetrators of
prejudice. This means that not unlike majority members, targets ofprejudice
may have biases that influence their processes of retrieval, encoding, or both
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when interpreting the behavior of those not in their group, this may occur
without their awareness that their expectancies have biased their judgments or
that they even held expectancies about others, thus qualifying as a relatively
implicit process (see Blair, 2001). Indeed, previous work on targets' explicit
attributions ofprejudice concerning majority members has indicated that biases
do exist in some situations, for example when the target ofjudgments behavior
is ambiguous, and, for some types ofpeople (e.g., group identification), yet in
these studies participants were what Gilbert et al. (1988) might characterize as
relativelypassive perceivers. By the term passive, what is meant is that
participants had ample cognitive resources available to devote to their judgment
of a target, as opposed to active perceivers whose minds are busy or
preoccupied with other tasks (e.g., trying to rehearse information, concerned
about impression management). For this reason, previous work on targets'
attributions regarding prejudice only told part of the story--that some targets of
prejudice have biases that may be the result of individual differences, and that
most targets ofprejudice see bias under conditions ofhigh certainty. The part of
the story that has remained unknown is the cognitive processes that have led to
the differences found in research using explicit measures. In other words, what
happens to these perceivers when the amount of cognitive resources they can
devote to making a judgment is varied, as it typically is in everyday life?
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In our first study, we used a cognitive load manipulation as a first
attempt to examine whether biases occur at encoding, retrieval, or both.
Moreover, we sought to determine whether biases are the result of an effortful
motivation on the part of the perceiver or are the result of a fairly routinized and
automatic process. Using a similar method to one used by Gilbert et al. (1988),
our study rested on the assumption that when individuals are operating with
limited resources it impairs their ability to effortfully correct and use situational
constraint information. Thus as was found in their work, we expected that more
dispositionally-related inferences (prejudice and anxiousness) would be made
when participants were under cognitive load, and that in the face of two options
some individuals (those high in stigma-consciousness) might infer prejudice
more than others. This was done by segmenting our participants into people
who hold different expectancies for prejudice. By doing this, we felt we might
be able to determine if differences typically found on explicit tasks would be
found on a relatively implicit task. In other words, we hypothesized that the
attributions ofmembers of stigmatized groups would differ under cognitive
load as opposed to no load, but suspected that these differences might be
moderated by individuals' expectancies for prejudice.
Our main findings from the first study revealed that low stigma-
consciousness targets ofprejudice rated an ambiguous Caucasian target lower
in terms ofprejudice than high stigma-consciousness target members regardless
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of load. The findings suggest that differences at the explicit level may be the
result of over- learned, automated responses that can occur even when the
participant is under cognitive load. Yet, despite what appear to be chronic
differences in the tendency to perceive prejudice, when group membership is
made accessible even targets whose expectancies for prejudice are generally
low may be temporarily affected. In study 2, by priming the concept of female
through a perspective- taking manipulation we were able to observe that
individuals low in stigma consciousness rated a person behaving in an
ambiguously gender-biased manner comparable to individuals high in stigma-
conscIOusness.
As other research addressing category activation has made evident, it
would be important to use other priming methods and dependent measures
(e.g., reaction times, other forms ofjudgment) in order to add more validity to
our findings. We are assuming that our priming method activated the category
ofwoman and this led to the heightened expectancy of gender-bias, but stronger
evidence could be provided using subliminal priming methods to activate group
membership or to activate stereotypes associated with gender-biased males.
This might provide insight into what are the associates that make up the concept
of a biased male and what concepts ought to be activated in order to influence
peoples' judgments. Preliminary research that we have done with women
suggests that both high and low stigma-consciousness women, in much the
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same way that high and low prejudiced individuals are aware of the cultural
stereotype ofAfrican-Americans, have the same semantic associations of the
concept of a gender- biased male. This suggests that there are no differences in
the concept, but in the relative accessibility between these groups.
Another direction that would allow us to delve further into the possible
automatic, habitual nature of inferences to prejudice, particularly on the part of
some group members, and likewise the possible ability to inhibit unintended
social inference by others, would be to explore this question using spontaneous
trait methods. These methods have been used as a means to showing that people
make inferences without any intention to infer traits or form impressions. As
such, these kinds ofmethods would surely provide us with a deeper level of
analysis concerning the efficiency with which inferences to prejudice might be
made on the part ofthose who are typically targets' ofprejudice.
Lastly, we would also like to explore these processes in situations in
which targets ofprejudice are the direct recipient of feedback from a majority
member. In the current studies, participants made attributions about a majority
member who was interacting with another member of the participants'
presumed group, but was not the participant themselves. Therefore, it would be
critical to do studies in which participants who are typically the targets of
prejudice are responding to a majority member under ambiguous conditions in
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which their cognitive resources are also manipulated so as to measure
expectancy processes that are occurring automatically.
Conclusion
The literature on categorization and stereotyping processes has been
mixed with respect to whether temporary processing objectives and chronic
individual differences can override categorical thinking (for reviews, see Bargh,
1999; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). The view espoused here is that
expectancies about members of other groups, regardless ofmajority or minority
status, can operate rather automatically and very possibly without one's
conscious intent as information always has the potential to be activated in
memory. This is not to suggest that these processes are inevitable, as control is
possible, particularly when perceivers are committed to specific belief systems
and goals that through continued use become the more dominant and automatic
cognitive response. For example, it has been found that individuals with chronic
egalitarian beliefs pre-consciously control stereotype activation (Moskowitz et
aI., 1999). Future work that more fully examines the conditions that lead
target's ofprejudice to perceive bias on the part ofmajority members, as well
as those conditions that prevent expectancies from being activated, will increase
our understanding of the nature of categorical social perception more generally,
but also provide a less one sided account of the cognitive processes that may
influence inter-group relations. This work may also provide a more cognitive
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based account of the classic expectancy/ perceptual bias effects (e.g., Kleck &
Strenta, 1980) that have been found in explicit research dealing with targets.
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Table 1
Discussion Topics and Target's Behavior
Topics
public humiliation
hidden secrets
sexual fantasies
favorite hobbies
embarrassing moments
ideal vacations
personal failures
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Target's Behavior
anxIOUS
anxIOUS
anxIOus
relaxed
anxIOUS
relaxed
anxIOUS
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Table 2
Implicit Social Inferences
Perceptions ofTarget as a Function ofStigma-Consciousness and Load
Participant's
Stigma-Consciousness
Prejudice ratings
Load
No-Load
71
Low
3.23
3.77
High
4.38
4.17
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Table 3
Implicit Social Inferences
Perceptions ofTarget as a Function ofStigma-Consciousness and Load
Participant's
Stigma-Consciousness
Trait Anxiousness ratings
Load
No-Load
72
Low
4.64
4.39
High
4.90
5.00
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Table 4
Implicit Social Inferences
Perceptions ofTarget as a Function ofStigma-Consciousness and Load
Participant's
Stigma-Consciousness
Predicted Anxiousness ratings
Load
No-Load
73
Low
6.36
5.31
High
6.00
5.80
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Table 5
Genderbiased perceptions oftarget as a function ofperspective-taking
Participant's
Stigma-Consciousness
Perspective
Solo Black Male
Solo Female
74
Low
4.32
4.86
High
5.05
4.65
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Appendix A
Sue ran into her old acquaintance Donald the other day, and since by
coincidence they took their vacations at the same time they decided to get
together at his house a few days later. Soon after she arrived, a saleswoman
knocked at the door, but Donald did not buy anything from her. Sue talked for
a while (Donald still has the habit of correcting her while they were talking).
Donald told her he was refusing to pay his rent until the landlady repaints his
apartment. They had lunch, and then went out for a ride. They stopped at a
hardware store. Sue was sort ofpreoccupied, but Donald bought some small
gadget, and then she heard him ask for his money back from the saleswoman.
Sue couldn't find what she was looking for, so they left and walked a few
blocks to another store. It's funny that Sue hadn't noticed it before, but when
they got to the store, she found that it had gone out ofbusiness. They talked for
a while in the park about what was going on in their lives. Donald still had the
habit ofusing profanity in informal speech. It was getting kindoflate, so Sue
took Donald home and they agreed to meet again as soon as possible.
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